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It is a commonplace in philosophical historiography that the psychologi-
cal doctrines of Platonic origin stand in sharp contrast to the Aristotelian
ones: the former entail a clear-cut dualism – possibly to be interpreted as
a genuine opposition – between soul and body; the latter instead ensure a
closer and more realistic harmony between the psychic and physical com-
ponents of man. In other words, Plato's position would be a weighty and
implausible metaphysical hypothesis, whereas Aristotle's position would
be a sober and balanced attempt to account for experience. Precisely on
the basis of this assessment, Aristotle's psychological doctrines are popu-
lar not just among historians of philosophy, but also among many con-
temporary philosophers, whereas Plato's avowedly dualistic psychology is
brushed to the side as a fanciful and unscientific theory, insofar as it con-
sciously ignores experiential data. In the following pages, I aim to at least
raise a few doubts with regard to this commonplace.
The theoretical root of the difference between Platonic and Aris-
totelian psychology would consist in the fact that whereas for Plato the
soul is a substance (to use Aristotelian terminology) that is separable –
and at times separate – from the body, according to Aristotle it is the
form or act of the living organism: since, for Aristotle, form is not really
separable from the corresponding matter, although it is separable as a no-
tion, psychological unity is in principle ensured. Precisely for this reason,
Aristotle was bound to regard the Orphic, Pythagorean and Platonic doc-
trine of metempsychosis as absurd. On the other hand, Platonic dualism
would seem to raise a theoretical problem that is difficult to solve, and
which is made explicit in the words by which Plotinus opens the first
treatise of the fifth Ennead:
What is it, then, which has made the souls forget their father, God,
and be ignorant of themselves and him, even though they are parts
which come from his higher world and altogether belong to it? The
I.
beginning of evil for them was audacity and coming to birth and the
first otherness and the wishing to belong to themselves (V 1 1, tr.
Armstrong).
This problem can be broken down into two different, if connected, as-
pects. First of all, a Platonist is bound to ask why, from a general meta-
physical standpoint, a wholly immaterial and divine entity such as the
soul has become attached to a body. Secondly, it is a matter of taking ac-
count of the ethical aspect of this apparently unnatural union: is the
soul's descent into a body to be viewed as something positive, insofar as it
serves the providential purpose of giving life to matter (and hence of ani-
mating the world), as the Timaeus would seem to suggest? Or is this a fall,
a contamination, possibly the consequence of a transgression, as dia-
logues such as the Phaedo and Phaedrus would seem to suggest? Is the na-
ture of the soul in harmony or in contrast with the functions it is meant
to fulfil? More generally, does this double perspective not adumbrate an
ambiguity inherent to Platonic philosophy as a whole, in a way, and
which concerns not just the ontological value and weight of matter and
the body, but also the assessment of the earthly dimension, the meaning
and usefulness of demotic virtues, and the role to be assigned to ethical
reflection and political engagement in Platonic thought? If so-called Pla-
tonic dualism is taken at face value, it seems as though the alleged coexis-
tence, on two different levels, of a physical reality and a metaphysical one
is invariably compromised: if this dualism is reinforced as an opposition,
contrast and alternative, it is clear that it will no longer be possible to af-
firm the full existence of this and that reality; rather, it will be necessary
to argue that we either have one thing or the other. And since the meta-
physical dimension is clearly superior according to Plato, all this is to the
detriment of the body, of earthly life, of relational ethics, and of politics.
Once again, this development is sharply laid out by Plotinus, who claims
that from a Platonic perspective all action is failed contemplation.1 This
means that action (and hence man's physical operating within the world,
along with ethics and politics) is not only inferior to contemplation but
has no intrinsic positive value; it is merely the negative counterpart to the
one thing that is of some value, and which is therefore worth pursuing:
contemplation.
1 Enn. III 8.
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One of the most crucial Platonic passages dealing with this problem –
crucial, that is, not so much for Plato himself as for the systematic use of
it made by the subsequent tradition, starting with so-called Middle Pla-
tonism – is the famous digression on the philosopher in the Theaetetus.
Here the aim of human life is seen to coincide with man's assimilation to
God (176a8-c2):
And therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of
the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so
far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous
and holy and wise. But, indeed, my good friend, it is not at all easy to
persuade people that the reason generally advanced for the pursuit of
virtue and the avoidance of vice – namely, in order that a man may
not seem bad and may seem good – is not the reason why the one
should be practised and the other not; that, I think, is merely old
wives’ chatter, as the saying is. Let us give the true reason. God is in
no wise and in no manner unrighteous, but utterly and perfectly [c]
righteous, and there is nothing so like him as that one of us who in
turn becomes most nearly perfect in righteousness (tr. Fowler).
When taken as a whole, this passage is actually far from identifying the
aim of human life with the abandonment of the earthly dimension. Cer-
tainly, the first sentence urges man to flee “from earth to the dwelling of
the gods” as soon as possible. It is also true that this flight is immediately
identified with assimilation to God. However, two significant elements
would seem to militate against an interpretation of this passage in ascetic
and metaphysical (or exclusively metaphysical) terms. The first element is
the clause “as far as this is possible”, which Socrates immediately adds.
The context is a typically Platonic one where we have a (perfect) model
and a copy that imitates it. The clause “as far as this is possible” makes
explicit what is actually already implicit in the notion of “similarity”. That
which is similar to something else resembles it in certain respects but not
others,2 for otherwise the copy and its model would be indistinguishable
and would amount to the same thing.3 Therefore, assimilation to God
cannot mean “being identical to God”; rather, it must mean “achieving
(or striving to achieve) the highest possible degree of resemblance to
him”. The easiest way to understand the nature of this resemblance is ap-
2 Cf. Phaed. 77b-80c: the soul is similar to the Ideas, yet it is not an Idea.
3 Cf. Crat. 432b-c.
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parently to identify one or more qualities that the model possesses in full,
and then establish that the imitator possesses the same qualities to the
highest possible degree. For example, if the model is omniscient, om-
nipotent etc. like the Christian God, assimilation to God must mean be-
coming as wise, powerful etc. as possible. If the essential feature of the
model is instead pure contemplation, as Plotinus contends (in agreement
with his Aristotelian model), then man must devote his life to knowl-
edge, as far as possible.
However, the Platonic text does not meet these expectations, so much
so that it poses a rather challenging problem to Plotinus. Socrates ex-
plains that to assimilate oneself to God is to practice virtue, and in partic-
ular justice. The problem that this raises for Plotinus lies in the fact that it
would seem to undermine the aforementioned relation between action
and contemplation. Indeed, the various virtues appear to be intrinsically
connected to action; hence, they imply the possession of a body and the
presence of the subject within earthly reality. By contrast, he who wishes
to make himself similar to God seeks to flee from this reality, to separate
himself from matter, the body and all the hindrances created by his needs
and desires (in accordance with the Phaedo passages we will soon be dis-
cussing). The passage from the Thaetetus, therefore, seems to imply a sub-
tle yet inevitable paradox: man attempts to assimilate himself to God by a
means (the attainment of virtue) that makes it impossible to achieve this
aim, since it forces man to cling to certain essential human traits, which
give rise to an irresolvable incompatibility with the model to be imitated.
This is not the place to examine Plotinus' solution in detail (I will refer
to CATAPANO, 2006). However, it is interesting to note that his sugges-
tion, based on the asymmetry of the relation of resemblance between
man and God (whereas the former assimilates himself to the latter, the
latter is not similar to the former in any respect), could never work for
Plato. The philosopher assigns a crucial role – in cosmology and especial-
ly in politics – to the “technical” scheme that posits the necessary exis-
tence at all levels of a model which the imitating craftsman (the demi-
urge, the philosopher-politician) can contemplate, in order to produce
copies as similar to it as possible within earthly reality. It is evident, there-
fore, that the relation of resemblance between the copy and its model
cannot work only from the bottom up, as Plotinus would have it, but
must also work in the opposite direction, for otherwise the technical
paradigm could find no application. This is not a problem for Plotinus,
who on the one hand downplays the “technical” and providential role
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played by the demiurge,4 but on the other – and most importantly – has
no real interest in the political role of philosophy (as already noted, for
Plotinus action is nothing but failed contemplation). However, this is
hardly acceptable to Plato, who unhesitatingly affirms the centrality of
politics, and more generally of the technical activity by which human,
earthly and ever-changing matter is providentially and rationally mould-
ed after an external and unmoving divine model.
The crucial role played by politics in Plato's thought is, in certain re-
spects, the decisive factor that makes it necessary to tone down the clear-
cut dualism between soul and body that would seem to emerge from cer-
tain texts – such as the Theaetetus digression – that present no doubt as-
cetic aspects, even apparently extreme ones at times. Indeed, it is hardly a
coincidence that many interpreters of the Theaetetus have come to regard
the digression on the nature of the philosopher as an entirely or partly
negative model by which Plato aims to illustrate what philosophy must
not – and cannot – be, if it is to maintain an effective connection with the
world of ethics and politics (and hence make a successful attempt to
counter Protagorean relativism).5 It is certainly true that the digression
presents the philosopher in largely hyperbolic terms. However, this is a
conscious emphasis which serves the very opposite purpose from what
the interpreters just mentioned suggest. As we have seen, the best way to
assimilate oneself to God is to practice virtue. Even more importantly, de-
tachment from the world – a practice which in the digression is no doubt
associated with philosophers – is not intended to ensure the achievement
of an ascetic lifestyle, or even of a state of pure contemplation. The pur-
pose of distancing oneself from the body and the world is to create the
conditions for the attainment of knowledge of the universal, as far as this
is possible, which is the natural goal for philosophers. However, it is sig-
nificant that in a crucial passage of the digression (175c), as a salient ex-
ample of the universal knowledge to which the philosopher aspires, jus-
tice in itself is mentioned: an object whose knowledge is crucial not on
II.
4 See e.g. GERSON (1994), p. 56-57.
5 Cf., with different nuances, RUE (1993), FREDE (1999), MAHONNEY (2004),
and LANE (2005).
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the level of contemplation (where anything possessing the nature of what
is “in itself” would be enough), but rather on the level of action, morality,
and politics. The intentionally hyperbolic tone here is designed to stress
the merely apparent paradox that action and contemplation, when com-
bined, constitute a function that is algebraically the reverse of the one we
would expect. It is not true that the more the philosopher removes him-
self from the world and from concrete life, the more he detaches himself
from ethics and politics. Rather, exactly the opposite is true. According to
the technical model, the more knowledge we have of the ideal model of
justice in itself, the better we can establish justice in the real world. But if
philosophers are to achieve this goal, they must not waste any time en-
quiring about «the way to the agora […] where the courtroom is, or the
senate-house, or any other public place of assembly» (Theaet. 173c-d).
Philosophers must «neither hear the debates upon them nor see them
when they are published» (173d). Nor will they concern themselves with
question such as «What wrong have I done you or you me?» (175c).
Whereas according to the ordinary way of thinking all this simply means
that the philosopher is inept at practical living (consider the harsh criti-
cism that Callicles directs against Socrates in Gorg. 484c-485d), and hence
utterly devoid of an aptitude for politics, what Plato is arguing is actually
the very opposite. Because the philosopher is the only one to enquire
what justice in itself consists in, despite all appearances he is the only real
politician.
The same intentional paradox is also to be found in the dialogue
which is certainly the text with the most markedly ascetic background –
not least for its consolatory nature – namely the Phaedo. At the beginning
of the dialogue, Socrates must respond to the accusations levelled by his
friends, who in the face of the threat of death question the philosopher's
alleged happiness (in the Apology Socrates had argued that nothing bad
can befall the philosopher, either in life or death, 41c-d). He does so by
showing that the whole life of the philosopher is an exercise in dying, and
that therefore it would make no sense for him to fear death, as only after
death it will be possible for him (if at all) to attain the real goal in life,
namely the acquisition of knowledge of the Ideas.6 At first sight, it might
seem difficult to find a more unpolitical passage than this in Plato's writ-
ing. The philosopher's happiness – as roughly stated also in the Theaetetus
digression – is nothing but a flight from the world, which is to say his
6 Cf. TRABATTONI (2015).
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shift to a different and better reality. But what about ethics and politics,
then? What about eudaimonia and the leading of a good private and pub-
lic life in this world and in this life? In actual fact, here too – as in the
Theaetetus – Plato provides plenty of clues to suggest to the reader that he
is highlighting what is only an apparent paradox. Socrates concludes that
it is absurd for the philosopher to fear death.
‘Then is it not,’ said Socrates, ‘a sufficient indication, when you see a
man troubled because he is going to die, that he was not a lover of
wisdom but a lover of the body? [68c] And this same man is also a
lover of money and of honor, one or both.’
‘Certainly,’ said he, ‘it is as you say.’
‘Then, Simmias,’ he continued, ‘is not that which is called courage es-
pecially characteristic of philosophers?’
‘By all means,’ said he.
‘And self-restraint – that which is commonly called self-restraint,
which consists in not being excited by the passions and in being su-
perior to them and acting in a seemly way – is not that characteristic
of those alone who despise the body [68d] and pass their lives in phi-
losophy?’ (68b8-c12, tr. Fowler).
After that, as is widely known, Socrates develops a series of arguments to
clarify the difference between common virtues (what we might call de-
motic virtues) and truly philosophical ones. The opportunity to switch
from the topic of death to that of virtue is offered in a perfectly natural
way by the evident connection between death and courage. Yet this is not
enough to justify the insertion, at this particular point in the text, of a
treatment of virtues that breaks up the linear unfolding of the dialogue:
1) Socrates is about to die; 2) he must show that death is not a bad thing
for him; 3) he does so by showing that philosophy is an exercise in dying;
4) however, he must also show (as Cebes asks him to do, for else the
whole argument would not hold) that man, or at any rate his soul, sur-
vives death. How does the “digression” on virtue fit within this scheme?
In reality, the situation mirrors, if only in a reverse way, what we find in
the Theaetetus. In the Theaetetus an ethical and political context (Socrates
has just noted that Protagorean relativism struggles to justify the actual
political praxis of cities) is interrupted by a digression with “ascetic” over-
tones, whereas the exact opposite occurs in the Phaedo: a highly ascetic
context is suddenly interrupted by an ethical and political digression. My
thesis is that both cases offer the same explanation, if only in inverted
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terms: when what is at issue is the need for philosophy, and hence
philosophers, on the ethical and political level (which in the Theaetetus is
justified by the ethical-political inadequacy of relativism), Plato draws at-
tention to the paradox according to which philosophy can play a political
role precisely insofar as it is an ascetic practice; when what is at issue is
the ascetic nature of the philosopher, Plato feels the need to warn the
reader that this nature of the philosopher not only does not detach him
from ethics and politics, but that on the contrary it makes him the only
person competent in such matters (Phaedo). What is particularly signifi-
cant, in my view, is precisely the “digression” in the Phaedo. In this dia-
logue Plato faces a truly challenging task, since the forced circumstances
of Socrates' death sentence present the problem in an extreme form. The
enquiry risks slipping into an alternative that makes any attempt at medi-
ation difficult, if not impossible. How is it possible to show that the
philosopher is happy even after death, if not on the basis of the hypothe-
sis that the real life is not “this one” but “another one”? And if the real life
is a different one, how can we hope to preserve the ethical and political
vocation of the philosopher, which Plato unambiguously affirms and re-
calls again and again? Hence the sudden reference to virtues. It is as
though Plato were trying to tell his readers: I have just explained that the
distinguishing trait of the philosopher is the exercise of dying; however,
this should not be taken to suggest that philosophy has no relevance on
the ethical-political level; on the contrary, it is possible to show that only
the disposition I have described makes the ethical and political virtues
what they are, for otherwise they would be only a pale imitation (the
same principle is reaffirmed by Socrates later on, at 83e). Divine or philo-
sophical virtues, in other words, encompass human virtues, in the sense
that human virtues only become real virtues if they have divine virtues as
their model.7
7 Of course, the hypothesis I have put forward is only acceptable if the section of
the Phaedo concerning virtues is not interpreted as being inevitably removed from
the one featured in the Republic, and hence as useless on the political level (as sug-
gested for instance by FREDE, 1999). As I have already discussed this problem in
TRABATTONI (2007), I will refer the reader to this essay for a more detailed ana-
lysis.
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This state of affairs finds various expressions in Plato's writing: the well-
known identification between the philosopher and the politician in the
Republic and Seventh Letter; the need to uphold the political profile of the
philosopher against accusations of ineptitude, as in the Gorgias and Repu-
blic (esp. 473e-474a e 487b-d; but let us not forget that this is also the
avowed purpose of the myth of the cave, namely to identify apaideusia as
the cause of philosophers' lack of recognition among ordinary people);
and, finally, the only apparently ambiguous nature of Socrates “the
philosopher”, who in the Apology affirms to have never engaged in politics
(31c-32e), but then in the Gorgias claims to be the only Athenian of his
day to have practised the true art of politics (521d). However, politics is
not the main concern. In its apparent conflict with theory (or contempla-
tion, if we prefer), politics only serves as an example to illustrate the di-
alectical and functional nature of all forms of Platonic dualism, where a
pair of terms are distinguished from one another (insofar as they can be
separated) and asymmetrically placed on two different levels, yet at the
same time never stand to one another as mere alternatives. The distinc-
tions between real and ideal, action and theory, politics and philosophy,
body and soul, do not constitute a binary and parallel system in Plato,
whereby we must take either this side or that, and in choosing one thing
must abandon the other. For Plato, the real is not real (i.e. cannot be un-
derstood as real) without a reference to an ideal model; there can be no
action without theory, and no politics without philosophy; most impor-
tantly, we are not forced to choose the body to the detriment of the soul
and vice-versa, since it is precisely by virtue of the separability of the body
that the soul can take a leading role with respect to the human being,
who is composed of soul and body, so as to promote and ensure his prop-
er functioning (not merely as a soul but as a composite of soul and body).
The less man engages in action and the more he practices contemplation,
the more competent he becomes in politics. Likewise, the more the soul
distances itself and becomes separate from the body, with its desires and
needs, the more it is capable of leading the body (so as ensure a good life
for individuals and communities, insofar as this is possible).
In other words, to get back to the question raised at the beginning of
the present essay, I would argue that it is incorrect to draw a contrast be-
tween Aristotle's psychology and Plato's, as though the former sought to
realistically account for the psychophysical harmony of man, and the lat-
III.
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ter portrayed man as being torn between two different and alternative
drive, whereby no positive outcome may be reached unless one sacrifices
the inferior and weaker element. On the contrary, according to Plato it is
precisely the relative separation between soul and body that provides the
most suitable empirical illustration of the psychophysical harmony of
man, including all his physiological, psychological, and ethical functions.
For Plato, this separation is not a way to show the essentially metaphysi-
cal nature of man, as opposed to what he actually is in his current and
concrete condition (according to the famous image of man as an embod-
ied soul); rather, from an empirical and rational perspective, it is the most
realistic way to correctly describe man as he actually is, with all his plans,
desires, and aspirations. Had Plato been given the chance to counter the
Aristotelian conception of the soul, his most significant objection would
not have been – as arguably most scholars suggest – that the soul as the
“form of the body” impoverishes the divine nature of man by making
him inextricably bound to matter. Rather, he would have argued that the
idea of the soul as the form of the body does not adequately explain the
make-up of man. I will now adduce some arguments in support of this
thesis.
Let's start by asking some questions. When in the Phaedo Socrates in-
vites his friends to become as detached from the body as possible, what
exactly does he mean? And what does this advice imply? What is its ulti-
mate purpose? The actual separation of soul and body?
These questions find an answer in another important passage of the
Phaedo, in which Socrates explains why it is dangerous for us not to do
our best to minimise the demands imposed by our material nature. Right
from this moment, it is important to stress the fact that in any case the
separation could not be a complete one, given that if man is to continue
to exist as a man he must ignore the physiological needs of his organism
(even though he can choose to meet these needs to the smallest possible
extent, as Socrates recommends). We will return to this point shortly. For
the time being, it is important to examine the final part of the section:
‘The lovers of knowledge, then, I say, perceive that philosophy, taking
possession of the soul when it is in this state, encourages it gently and
tries to set it free, pointing out that the eyes and the ears and the oth-
er senses are full of deceit, and urging it to withdraw from these, ex-
cept in so far as their use is unavoidable, and exhorting it to collect
and concentrate itself within itself, and to trust nothing except [83b]
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itself and its own abstract thought of abstract existence; and to be-
lieve that there is no truth in that which it sees by other means and
which varies with the various objects in which it appears, since every-
thing of that kind is visible and apprehended by the senses, whereas
the soul itself sees that which is invisible and apprehended by the
mind. Now the soul of the true philosopher believes that it must not
resist this deliverance, and therefore it stands aloof from pleasures
and lusts and griefs and fears, so far as it can, considering that when
anyone has violent pleasures or fears or griefs or lusts he suffers from
them not merely what one might think – for example, illness or loss
of money spent [83c] for his lusts – but he suffers the greatest and
most extreme evil and does not take it into account.’
‘What is this evil, Socrates?’ said Cebes.
‘The evil is that the soul of every man, when it is greatly pleased or
pained by anything, is compelled to believe that the object which
caused the emotion is very distinct and very true; but it is not. These
objects are mostly the visible ones, are they not?’ (83b5-c9, tr. Fowler).
In my view, the key point of this passage is as follows. Socrates does not
argue that excessively or chiefly concerning oneself with the body is a bad
thing merely on the basis of a dualistic contrast, whereby the body and
care of it would be “bad”, but the soul and the care of it would be “good”.
The problem with souls overly attached to the body does not lie in the
fact that they are incapable of freeing themselves from the body (besides,
in the Phaedo Socrates warns his readers that suicide is not a legitimate
option), but rather in the fact that in such a way they end up believing
that the body, i.e. that which is material, is the thing that exists in the
most evident and truest way (ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον). But
in actual fact – and this is the point that Socrates is trying to make – the
reality which exists in the most evident and truest way is not sensible real-
ity but intelligible reality (hence the soul, which has the latter as its ob-
ject, is clearly superior to the body). Therefore, according to the Socrates
of the Phaedo, both the body and the soul exist, yet in an asymmetrical
relation. As the truest reality is that of the soul, it follows that care of the
soul is a far more worthwhile pursuit than care of the body. The point is
that according to Plato both the existence of body and soul and the supe-
riority of the latter over the former imply separation. The empirical data
we must account for are first of all the actual separation between impuls-
es, desires and physical needs on the one hand, and values and goals of a
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spiritual nature, on the other; and, secondly, the superiority – in terms of
the complete fulfilment of human nature – of the goods of the soul over
those of the body. If this is the case, then the most effective theoretical
model is the one distinguishing soul and body as two different and sepa-
rable objects. Naturally, it may be objected that the analysis of the experi-
ence mentioned here is incorrect, and that therefore the dualistic theoret-
ical model has not been adequately justified. This might be true from a
general perspective; but it was far from obvious for the poetic and philo-
sophical tradition of the Greeks, from Homer to Socrates and the Socrat-
ics: for the most prevalent perception was that expounded by Plato,
which sees the soul and body as two different things of unequal value. In
any case, this is not the real point at issue. What matters is the fact that
for Plato psychological dualism is justified – regardless of the correctness
of one's argument – by the need to account for experience, and not by
the desire to assign human nature different traits from those it actually
possesses.
According to Plato, the fact that the soul is superior to the body and
separable from it implies that it can also exist on its own, which is to say
in a disembodied and purely spiritual condition. This discloses a poten-
tially very weighty metaphysical background; hence the efforts made by
contemporary scholars to downplay this aspect of Platonic thought – for
example, by reducing it to a metaphor. In my view, this “reduction” is un-
tenable, or at any rate methodologically incorrect. But, again, this is not
what matters here. The reduction just mentioned is usually carried out in
order to safeguard the interest of Platonic philosophy in “this world”, the
world which actually exists – and its pertinence to it – particularly as re-
gards ethics, politics, anthropology, and so on. But this is an ill-founded
concern. The possibility that the soul might lead a better life in disem-
bodied form is a side effect of the separability of soul and body required
by our analysis of experience. Therefore, the fact that the the best condi-
tion for man is to become all soul and no body in no way changes the
fact that the separability of the soul is the precondition for man to lead a
good life already in this world. The life of the disembodied soul, as the
life of a bodiless soul, is no doubt a form of life unknown to us, one ut-
terly different from the life we experience. While the death of man is
nothing but the separation of soul and body (as we read in the Phaedo),
the life of man consists in the soul's animation of the body. The life of the
separate soul, then, is a different thing; as such, it in no way undermines
the intrinsic unity of soul and body in the living mortal being. The unity
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of soul and body would be compromised if the soul could lead the kind
of life it leads in the body even without it. In such a case, the body would
be superfluous – it would be nothing but a burden. But the life of disem-
bodied souls is the life of gods, not men. Hence, for Plato the separability
of the soul constitutes both the basis for a future super-human and disem-
bodied life, and the most effective explicative and guiding model to un-
derstand and regulate the life of man in his present condition, under-
stood as the soul's animation of the body.
In support of the thesis I have put forward in the previous pages, namely
that for Plato the marked dualism between soul and body is chiefly re-
quired as an explicative model to account for experiential data, I will
shortly be discussing a problem which Plato raises again the Phaedo: the
so-called doctrine of the soul as harmony. This will also allow us to carry
out an interesting comparison with the Aristotelian position. Against the
doctrine of the soul as harmony (of the body), which Simmias presents in
the Phaedo as an objection to the thesis of the immortality of the soul
championed by Socrates, the text puts forward three different argu-
ments.8 Here we are concerned with only one of them, the argument ex-
pounded at lines 94b4-95a2:
‘Well,’ said Socrates, ‘of all the parts that make up a man, do you
think any is ruler except the soul, especially if it be a wise one?’
‘No, I do not.’
‘Does it yield to the feelings of the body or oppose them? I mean,
when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul oppose it and
draw it away from drinking, and from eating when it is hungry, and
do we not see the soul opposing the body in countless other ways?’
‘Certainly.’9
IV.
8 See TRABATTONI (1988).
9 In the Republic (439c-e) the same argument is used not to show the independence
of the soul from the body, but to uphold the idea of the tripartition of the soul.
But this issue does not concern us. If what is at issue here is the autonomy of the
soul with respect to the body, the problem does not apply at all to a soul responsi-
ble for all the vital functions of man.
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‘Did we not agree in our previous discussion that it could never, if it
be a harmony, give forth a sound at variance with the tensions and
relaxations and vibrations and other conditions of the elements
which compose it, but that it would follow them and never lead
them?’
‘Yes,’ he replied, ‘we did, of course.’
‘Well then, do we not now find that the soul acts in exactly the oppo-
site way, leading those elements of which it is said to consist and op-
posing them in almost everything through all our life, and tyranniz-
ing over them in every way, sometimes inflicting harsh and painful
punishments (those of gymnastics and medicine), and sometimes
milder ones, sometimes threatening and sometimes admonishing, in
short, speaking to the desires and passions and fears as if it were dis-
tinct from them and they from it, as Homer has shown in the
Odyssey when he says of Odysseus:10
He smote his breast, and thus he chid his heart:
“Endure it, heart, you have born worse than this.”
Do you suppose that, when he wrote those words, he thought of the
soul as a harmony which would be led by the conditions of the body,
and not rather as something fitted to lead and rule them, and itself a
far more divine thing than a harmony?’
‘By Zeus, Socrates, the latter, I think.’
‘Then, my good friend, it will never do for us to say that the soul is a
harmony; for we should, it seems, agree neither with Homer, the di-
vine poet, nor with ourselves’ (tr. Fowler).
Socrates' reasoning is quite straightforward. As, on the level of experi-
ence, it is possible for the human will to counter the desires and stimuli
of the body, within man there must be a subject responsible for this op-
position; not only that, but this subject must also be independent from
the body, for otherwise it would be incapable of offering any opposition
at all. Therefore, supposing that the subject in question is the soul, the
soul cannot be a harmony (or agreement) of bodily elements, for in such
a case all its operations would merely be the forced consequence of the
arrangement of bodily parts. The eventuality we experience on the empir-
10 XX, vv. 17-18 (Odysseus, who has just returned to Ithaca, conceals his indigna-
tion at the sight of the amorous exchanges between his maid servants and the
suitors).
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ical level of the soul disobeying the body and ordering it to act against its
own wishes would never occur.
A comparison with Aristotle proves interesting in this respect. Aristo-
tle too in the first book of De anima offers some arguments to refute the
doctrine of the soul as harmony, but these are not pertinent to our en-
quiry. Rather, it is significant that at the end of his refutation Aristotle in
a way seems to question the result achieved by posing the following
question:
εἰ δ’ἐστὶν ἕτερον ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς μίξεως, τί δή ποτε ἅμα τῷ (τὸ) σαρκὶ εἶναι
ἀναιρεῖται καὶ τὸ (τῷ) τοῖς ἄλλοις μορίοις τοῦ ζῴου.
I have left these two lines untranslated because the Greek is uncertain.
This (already according to Alexander of Aphrodisias11) makes at least two
different interpretations possible, which partially depend on the variants
I have added in brackets. I will present them in Ross' versions:12
(1) “If the soul is not a ἁρμονία, why is it that when the mixture which
constitutes flesh is destroyed, that of the other parts is destroyed with
it?”.
(2) “If the soul is not a ἁρμονία, why is it destroyed when the flesh is de-
stroyed?”.13
Before addressing the textual problems, let us consider the meaning of
each translation. The sentence occurs within the context of a series of ob-
jections that Aristotle raises against the doctrine of the soul as harmony.
Therefore, the most natural way to understand it would be as an exten-
sion/integration of the previous critical observations. Yet it is difficult to
see how this could be the case. What we have is a hypothetical sentence
that starts with the conditional clause “if the soul is not a harmony”, and
then introduces a factual element that ought to refute the hypothesis: if x
is not true, how do we explain y? Therefore, the conclusion ought to be
that x is true (namely, that the soul is a harmony). This is precisely the
opposite of how the sentence must be interpreted if we accept translation
(2). Besides, this version is hardly unproblematic, for it seems to intro-
duce a sort of foreign body into an argument that is heading in a very dif-
11 Ap. Philop. in de An. 153, 3ff. An overview of the positions adopted by the an-
cient commentators is provided by HICKS (1907), p. 271-272.
12 ROSS (1961), p. 197.
13 Among the ancient commentators, the first translation is accepted by Simplicius
and Philoponus, the second one by Themistius.
On Soul-Body “Dualism” in Plato 89
ferent direction. It is easy to understand why already the ancient com-
mentators took a second possibility into account, namely the one based
on translation (1). Apparently, there is little difference, because the hypo-
thetical structure remains the same; hence, it seems natural for the con-
clusion to support rather than disprove the doctrine of the soul as harmo-
ny. But let's consider the complex justification of translation (1) provided
by Alexander (via Philoponus). The sentence in his view refers to what
Aristotle has stated in the previous lines (408a10-18), and in particular to
his argument that if the soul were a mixture, given that different combi-
nations of elements are possible, we would have different souls. Alexan-
der takes this conclusion to mean that the doctrine of the soul as harmo-
ny necessarily implies the existence of multiple souls (ἐκ τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν
ἁρμονίαν λέγειν συμβαίνειν πολλὰς ψυχὰς ἔχειν τὸ ζῷον, Philop. in de An.
152, 34-35). But if we argue that, precisely because the soul is a harmony,
all the mixtures (both that of the flesh and those of all the other parts)
perish together, this implies the singularity of the soul: for else, this si-
multaneousness would be unaccountable. Therefore, the doctrine of the
soul as harmony would seem to be compromised, because on the one
hand it must grant the multiplicity of souls (given the multiplicity of mix-
tures), while on the other it must also grant the unity of the soul, since all
the mixtures perish together.14
This does not strike me as a very plausible explanation, for more than
one reason. First of all, the argument would be adduced too late, since
the discussion of the multiplicity of souls had already been brought to an
end a few lines before, after which the debate had taken a different turn
(the focus had shifted to Empedocles' doctrine).15 Secondly, if Aristotle
truly meant to say what Alexander believes, he would hardly have given
the sentence a hypothetical form. Rather, he would have argued along the
following lines: given the structural multiplicity of mixtures, the doctrine
of the soul as harmony implies the plurality of souls; bodily mixtures per-
ish together; hence, if the soul were a harmony, it would have to be simul-
14 Philop. in de An. 152, 3-10: εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἴη, φησίν, ἡ ψυχὴ ἁρμονία ἀλλ’ἕτερόν τι τῆς
μίξεως, διὰ τί τῆς μίξεως τῆς σαρκὸς φθειρομένης καὶ ἡ τῶν λοιπῶν μορίων
συμφθείρεται μῖξις; εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, δόξειεν ἂν μία μῖξις εἶναι πάντων τῶν μορίων καὶ
οὐ πολλαί· διὰ τί γὰρ τῇ μιᾷ πᾶσαι συμφθείρονται; οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ μία ἔσται
καὶ οὐ πολλαί, εἰς ὃ ἄτοπον ἀπάγεσθαι ἐδόκει ὁ λόγος ὁ λέγων τὴν ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν




taneously one and many. In this reasoning, the second premise carries an
absolute meaning, so it makes no sense to make it conditional upon the
hypothesis that the soul is a harmony. If the soul were not a harmony,
wouldn't the various bodily mixtures perish together anyway? Finally, the
sentence we are discussing has a clearly contrastive sense, as is shown by
the opening δέ.
It thus seems to me that the only acceptable meaning is the one ex-
pressed by translation (2). The fact that this is a kind of aside that is not
taken any further does not strike me as a problem, since Aristotle fre-
quently interrupts or attempts to problematise his argument: a feature
that probably reflects the aporematic nature of his thought, as well as the
dialogical-dialectic dynamics inherent in teaching. After having refuted
the doctrine of the soul as harmony, Aristotle note the problem of the
compatibility of what he has just stated with his own views: if, as Aristo-
tle's philosophy suggests, the soul perishes the very moment it is stripped
of “the mixture which constitutes flesh and that of the other living parts”,
it would seem as though the theory according to which the soul is the
harmony of the body represents the most natural and effective explana-
tion for what has just been argued, namely that the soul perishes together
with the body. Hence Aristotle's question: why, despite this, is the soul
not a harmony? In other words, notwithstanding all the objections al-
ready raised, Aristotle here would be displaying a somewhat sympathetic
attitude towards the notion that the doctrine of the soul as harmony is
the explanation most compatible with the soul's dependence upon the
body. Giancarlo Movia has rightly noted that «of all his predecessors' doc-
trines, that of the soul as harmony is the one closest to the Aristotelian
thesis of the unity of soul and body».16
Let's see how all this might be compatible with the text. I will here
continue to follow Ross' commentary. In his view, translation (1) would
require τῷ at line 25 and τό at line 26 (although it would also be compati-
ble with the presence of τό in either position). By contrast, translation (2)
16 MOVIA (2001), p. 262 («fra tutte le dottrine dei predecessori, quella dell'anima-
armonia è la più vicina alla tesi aristotelica dell'unità dell'anima e del corpo»).
Cf. Philop. 151, 9-10: Ἐκτιθέμενος τὴν δόξαν τῶν λεγόντων ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν
ψυχὴν ἔλεγε πιθανὸν εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.
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would require τῷ in either case. Here is breakdown of the three possibili-
ties, accompanied by the respective translations:
(a) τῷ at line 26 and τό at line 25:
“together with the mixture which constitutes flesh, also that of the
other material parts is destroyed” (tr. 1).
(b) τό in both cases:
“the mixture which constitutes flesh and that of the other material
parts are destroyed together” (tr. 1).
(c) τῷ in both cases
“[the soul] is destroyed together with the mixture which constitutes
the flesh and that of the other material parts” (tr. 2).
This breakdown is consistent with the fact that both HICKS (1907) and
HETT (1936), who adopt translation (2), choose to insert the article τῷ in
both positions (the same translation is provided by LAURENTI (1973),
which does not give the Greek text). However, Ross disagrees with this in-
terpretation, probably based on the fact that whereas the manuscripts are
more or less equally divided in their reading of line 25, almost all of them
favour τό at line 26. Therefore, Ross chose to print τό at line 26 but for
line 25 adopted τό in his 1956 editio minor and τῷ in his 1961 editio major.
Evidently, though, the meaning in his view does not change, because
whereas (1) is compatible with either variant, (2) necessarily requires τῷ
at line 26, and hence must apparently be ruled out. The translation fea-
tured in the editio major is consistent with (1). ROSS (1961) is followed by
MOVIA (2001), whereas CORCILIUS (2017) adopts ROSS (1956); both
scholars, in keeping with the Greek text they give, choose translation (1),
as BODEÜS (1993) does in his French translation (without the Greek).
The situation, to my mind, is quite clear. Some of the most respected
translations of last century chose the textual variant that practically entails
version (2), evidently on the grounds that this seems like the more natural
version and the one more in keeping with the hypothetical-dialectic na-
ture of the sentence. Later, other authors and commentators, starting
with Ross, deemed the philological factors more cogent, namely the in-
sufficient and weak attestation of τῷ at line 26; hence, they chose to leave
τό in that position, which led them to accept translation (1). It thus seems
as though we are dealing with a typical exegetical aporia: the variant that
seems more natural in terms of meaning is the less probable one as far as
the reconstruction of the text is concerned.
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In my view, the problem can be solved by proposing a fourth possibili-
ty, based on a different reading of the text according to (b), namely:
(b') τό in both cases:
“together [with the soul], the mixture which constitutes flesh and
that of the other material parts are destroyed” (2).
This would solve all problems. The question that Aristotle is suddenly
raising, possibly as a kind of annotation inserted in the text in view of fu-
ture considerations, might be taken to be the following: while there are
good reasons to reject the doctrine of the soul as harmony, one must also
bear in mind that the most natural position for someone wishing to
demonstrate the simultaneous passing away of soul and body is a theory
similar to – or partly overlapping with – that of the soul as harmony. And
the Aristotelian conception of the soul as the form of the body would in-
deed appear to be a theory of this sort (as shown, in particular, by the in-
terpretation provided by Alexander of Aphrodisias17).
Given all this, we can now draw some conclusions. Had Plato known
the Aristotelian doctrine according to which the soul is the form of the
body, he would probably have countered it with an objection similar to
the one Socrates raises against Simmias in the Phaedo. He would not so
much – or merely – have argued, as throngs of later Platonists were to do
(Atticus, Plotinus, Porphyry, etc.18), that it is philosophically and meta-
physically outrageous to deny that the soul is a substance which is sepa-
rate, imperishable, divine, and so on. Rather, he would have argued that
the theory according to which the soul is the form of the body is inade-
quate on the scientific and explanatory level, since – just like the doctrine
of the soul as harmony, towards which Aristotle significantly shows some
indulgence – it fails to duly account for the psychological and ethical ele-
ments which de facto characterise man and his actions within the world.
17 See Alex. Aphr. De an., 24-26.
18 «Platon war kein Platoniker» (GADAMER, 1985-1991, p. 508).
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